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Abstract: The assumption that the economic growth seen in recent decades will continue
has dominated the discussion of future greenhouse gas emissions and the mitigation of
and adaptation to climate change. Given that long-term economic growth is uncertain,
the impacts of a wide range of growth trajectories should be considered. In particular,
slower economic growth would imply that future generations will be relatively less able
to invest in emissions controls or adapt to the detrimental impacts of climate change. Taking
into consideration the possibility of economic slowdown therefore heightens the urgency of
reducing greenhouse gas emissions now by moving to renewable energy sources, even if
this incurs short-term economic cost. I quantify this counterintuitive impact of economic
growth assumptions on present-day policy decisions in a simple global economy-climate
model (Dynamic Integrated model of Climate and the Economy (DICE)). In DICE, slow
future growth increases the economically optimal present-day carbon tax rate and the utility
of taxing carbon emissions, although the magnitude of the increase is sensitive to model
parameters, including the rate of social time preference and the elasticity of the marginal
utility of consumption. Future scenario development should specifically include low-growth
scenarios, and the possibility of low-growth economic trajectories should be taken into
account in climate policy analyses.
Keywords: climate policy; energy policy; global warming; optimization; economic growth
1. Introduction
“Prediction is very difficult, especially about the future.” Niels Bohr’s caution would surely apply
to extrapolating long-term change in the size and composition of the economic system, as technical
innovation and changing values and social structures are likely to change the controlling forces at least as
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much as they have changed in recent centuries. Nevertheless, scenarios of future global economic growth
and social change over century timescales are used in climate policy discussion for developing baseline
emissions scenarios, evaluating the effects of different emissions-reduction policies and quantifying the
harms to future generations of human-induced global warming. While diverse scenarios for economic
growth, derived under different assumptions, have been used for different climate policy studies, they
largely have in common that they assume a continuation of the rapid economic growth seen in the past
century. Under these scenarios, per capita wealth a century or two in the future will be much greater than
it is now.
Taking into account the possibility of economic growth rates at the lower end of the range of published
scenarios and of historical experience, however, can substantially change perspectives on the capabilities
for adapting to climate change and the wisdom of investment in mitigating greenhouse gas emissions.
Broadly speaking, slower than anticipated economic growth would mean lower than expected demand
for energy, which may result in reduced emissions compared with rapid-growth scenarios. However,
in a relatively poorer society, large-scale investment in reducing the greenhouse gas intensity of energy
consumption would be less feasible, and without sufficient development of renewable energy generation,
distribution and storage, the energy supply may remain tied to highly polluting fossil fuels, such as
coal and tar sands. The damage of climate impacts from greenhouse gas emissions and the cost of
their mitigation would also be less manageable under slow economic growth than in a very wealthy
society. Using a simple economic model of the cost of climate change to estimate optimal emissions
control trajectories, substantially more aggressive actions to reduce carbon emissions now are justified
if we assume slow economic growth in the coming centuries compared with scenarios assuming rapid
economic growth.
This paper is organized as follows: First, I review the different socioeconomic scenarios used for
climate research, placing emphasis on the 21st century gross world product (GWP) growth rate as a
simple indicator of the economic growth trajectory assumed. Second, I qualitatively discuss possible
implications of slow economic growth for greenhouse gas emissions trajectories and climate impacts.
Third, I quantify the dependence of optimal present policy on assumptions about future economic
growth in a simple integrated assessment model as an illustration of the qualitative considerations
adduced. The overall goal is to explore the implications of low growth for climate policy in a risk
assessment framework.
2. Assumptions about Economic Growth in the Climate Policy Literature
The Intergovernmental Panel for Climate Change (IPCC) has prepared several scenarios for the
evolution of population, economic activity, energy use and greenhouse gas and sulfur emissions through
2100. The IPCC scenario sets are intended, and are widely used, to provide a range of illustrative
greenhouse gas emissions series to drive climate models and to consider needs and options for the
mitigation of and adaptation to climate change. Like an earlier IPCC scenario set released in 1992 [1], the
IPCC’s Special Report on Emissions Scenarios (SRES) [2], released in 2000, envisions a wide range of
possible worlds for 2100, encompassing 40 scenarios grouped into four “families” and six “groups”. In
all the SRES scenarios, however, world economic production is much increased from the scenarios’ start
year of 1990. From US$27 trillion in 1990, the annual gross world product (GWP) is taken to increase,
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in real terms, 9–28 fold (to $238–748 trillion, when the dollar amounts are scaled to a common value
in 1990) by 2100 in the various SRES scenarios, corresponding to a rate of increase of 2.0%–3.1%/year
over the 110-year period (Figure 1). Using the respective scenarios’ population projections, per capita
GWP at 2100 would then be $16–106 thousand (1990 US dollars), up from $5 thousand in 1990.
Even the lowest figure of $16 thousand is approximately equal to the 1990 per capita gross domestic
product (GDP) of Italy or the United Kingdom and close to that of the wealthiest countries in 1990 (the
United States and Luxemburg, with per capita GDP of some $23 thousand) [3]. Thus, even the most
conservative SRES scenario envisions that economic growth will be sufficient to provide each of the
7–15 billion people assumed to live in 2100 with a standard of living comparable to that now common
only in a relatively few wealthy countries (although, depending on wealth distribution, many people
might still be poor). Interestingly, the range of 2100 GWP is narrower in SRES than in the earlier,
less extensively documented 1992 IPCC scenario set, which features six scenarios (referred to as the
1992 IPCC scenario (IS92) set) that have a range of growth rates in 1990–2100 of 1.2%–3.0%/year,
corresponding to 2100 GWP ranging from approximately $100 trillion (for scenario IS92c) to $700
trillion (for scenario IS92e) (Figure 1).
Figure 1. Scenarios of future growth in world production. Shown are historic production
growth for 1950–2006 (solid line), the range of projected production (fifth to 95th percentile)
for 2050 and 2100 among the scenarios collected in the Intergovernmental Panel for Climate
Change (IPCC) database (error bars), production in the four distinct 1992 IPCC economic
scenarios for 2025 and 2100 (x markers), the range of production in Special Report
on Emissions Scenarios (SRES) scenarios for 1990–2100 (gray shading) and the growth
trajectory of the DICE-2007 integrated assessment model with default parameter values
(dashed line). The vertical scale is logarithmic, so that a constant growth rate would plot
as a straight line.
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Broadly similar economic growth assumptions have been adopted even in studies of the economic
impact of global warming and of alternative mitigation strategies that do not employ IPCC scenario sets.
The assumptions about economic growth in William Nordhaus’ work with the Dynamic Integrated model
of Climate and the Economy (DICE) model [4–6] result in 21st-century growth trajectories just below the
lower bound of the SRES envelope. The model version DICE-2007 averages 1.6%/year growth in world
product (1.4%/year growth in per capita world product) over the period 2005–2100, for per capita GWP
of US$27 thousand (1990 dollars) in 2100. The Stern Review of the economics of climate change [7]
uses a different model, Policy Analysis for the Greenhouse Effect (PAGE2002), which similarly averages
1.3%/year growth in per capita output for 2001–2200, a rate which, for the purpose of calculating the
present value of future climate-change damage, is extended into the indefinite future. Earlier studies that
sought to estimate future emissions changes (e.g., [8–10]) or consider the merits of alternative emissions
abatement strategies (e.g., [11]) have also assumed that per capita GWP will increase by 1%–2%/year at
least through 2100.
The assumption of steadily increasing production is usually justified by extrapolation from
recent (19th and 20th century) production growth, as observed globally or in particular groups of
countries [8,9,11,12]. Often, there is an appeal to the consensus of earlier scenarios. The most
extensive work here has been done by SRES, which complied a database of over 100 long-term climate
scenarios and writes about the histogram of economic growth in these scenarios: “A very strong peak of
[2100 GWP] values lies at around US$250 trillion, which apparently represents an apparent[!] consensus
among modelers based on an average economic growth rate of about 2.3% per year.” [2] (p. 94). The fifth
to 95th percentile range of 1990–2100 growth rates among the scenarios in the database compiled for
SRES is 1.3%–2.4%/year, suggesting 2100 production of US$110–370 trillion (1990 dollars; Figure 1).
Compared with this scenario database, growth in the SRES scenarios is biased high: thus, while some
SRES scenarios envision growth above the database 95th percentile, no SRES scenarios have growth at
or below the fifth percentile (Figure 1). By contrast, the smaller 1992 scenario set better captures the
inter-scenario range in economic growth (Figure 1). The suite of SRES scenarios, or individual SRES
scenarios, has been widely used for simulation studies of climate impacts and policies [13–17].
The economic scenarios used to derive the newer Representative Concentration Pathways (RCPs)
used for the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report feature less discussion of the choice of economic growth
drivers than the SRES report did and an even smaller range for 2100 GWP, $180–270 trillion [18–22].
A new set of socioeconomic development scenarios, Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSPs), is under
development for climate mitigation and adaptation assessments [23]. The SSPs are intended to span
a range of challenges for climate adaptation and mitigation that allows for uncertainty in mitigation,
adaptation and impacts to be characterized [24]. The SSPs vary in the assumptions made about total
factor productivity growth in advanced countries and about the speed of convergence in production
between countries, resulting in a range of GWP growth rates. The range in 2100 GWP across 5 SSPs and
three modeling teams is $165–737 trillion, for a 1990–2100 GDP growth rate of 1.7%–3.1%/year [25].
2100 GWP per capita has a somewhat wider range of $15–100 thousand, since SSP scenarios with higher
population growth rates tend to feature lower GWP growth rates. Approximate mappings between SRES
scenarios, RCPs and SSPs have been derived [26].
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As a further explanation of the uniformly high economic growth rates in the scenarios it develops,
SRES supposes that in a “catastrophic” future that features “low or negative economic growth”,
greenhouse gas emissions would anyway not be a pressing priority “in light of more immediate
problems” [2] (p. 172). As I will show below, climate damages may well be comparatively severe
under scenarios of “low or negative economic growth”, so that ignoring such scenarios in considering
the hazards of human-caused climate change and the benefits of controlling greenhouse gas emissions is
not justified.
Economic history can provide some inspiration on possible future slow-growth trajectories. The
long-run course of human history can be seen as displaying accelerating economic growth, which
can be explained as a result of the discovery and spread of technical and social innovations [27–29].
Nevertheless, growth has not been steady, with different regions experiencing centuries-long periods of
static or declining production [3,30]. Barro and Ursúa [31] have compiled a list of “economic disasters”
since the 19th century on a country basis, defining these as a decline of at least 10% or 15% in per-capita
production. These economic disasters were generally precipitated by political events, such as world
wars and civil wars, or by combinations of political and economic factors, as in the Great Depression,
which were not only unforeseen at the time, but whose causes continue to be debated. (Whaples [32]
(p. 151) suggests, based on the level of disagreement revealed in a survey of economic historians, that
“Despite considerable innovative and painstaking subsequent research about the causes and nature of
the Great Depression, this may be a debate from which no consensus will ever emerge.”) The equally
unforeseen 1973 Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries oil embargo was followed by a
slowdown in world economic growth (seen as a break in slope in Figure 1), with per capita production
actually falling for decades in some regions, notably Africa [3]. Simulating sharp slowdowns in growth
similar to those seen historically would thus require modeling political crises and their adverse economic
impacts, for which no quantitative general model exists, as well as purely economic and physical (e.g.,
global-warming impacts and resource depletion) variables.
3. Implications of Slow Growth for Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trajectories
Historically, economic growth has correlated closely with more fossil fuel burning and higher
greenhouse gas emissions. Thus, if economic growth in the 21st century is lower than in the SRES
scenarios, emissions are also likely to be lower than these scenarios predict.
Two qualifications apply to this statement. First, given the limited reserves of easily extractable
petroleum and natural gas compared with hydrocarbons in the forms of tar sands and coal, a society that
continues to rely on fossil fuels for energy is likely to increasingly switch to the latter hydrocarbon
categories, which involve higher greenhouse gas emissions per unit of useful energy [33]. Large
additional carbon emissions from destructive biofuel production practices are also possible [34,35]. The
SRES scenarios envision that adequate petroleum and natural gas supplies will be available to meet
projected 21st century demand at only slowly increasing cost; however, a switch to fossil fuels with
lower energy density and higher carbon intensity could result in higher emissions than provided for
in these scenarios. A literature review suggests that without a tax on carbon, mining highly polluting
petroleum substitutes, such as tar sands, begins to be profitable at oil prices of $23–46 per barrel (2005
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dollars) [33]; by comparison, different SRES models and scenarios ([2] Tables 4-8, 4-9, 4-12) have oil
prices for 2020 ranging from $30–86/barrel, while actual current (2013) oil price is around $94/barrel.
An increase of greenhouse gas emissions per unit of energy consumed has already occurred since the
late 1990s, resulting in carbon dioxide emissions that have outpaced all the SRES scenarios [36].
Second, increasing national wealth makes social measures to control pollution more likely, a concept
expressed by the so-called environmental Kuznets curve [37]. While there is little historical evidence
for an absolute reduction in greenhouse gas emissions with increasing wealth [38,39], future stringent
controls on emissions would require substantial upfront investment, which may be more difficult to
undertake under slow economic growth. Although greenhouse gas emissions in the SRES scenarios
deliberately do not include the effects of any explicit greenhouse gas regulation, they do assume
substantial investments that reduce the energy and carbon intensity of world production [40]. Thus,
fossil-fuel greenhouse gas emissions trajectories for slow-growth scenarios, while possibly lower than
the SRES emissions trajectories, which assume fast economic growth, may still be high enough to inflict
severe additional climate change impacts.
4. Implications of Slow Growth to Climate-Change Damages and Mitigation
Poorer societies are less able to cope with climate-related disasters, and one can therefore expect that
while the monetary value of direct economic damage might be less in a smaller economy, the human
suffering stemming from a given amount of human-caused climate change will be greater to the extent
economic growth is slower than in the past. Indeed, a common argument against investing now to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions has been that future generations will be so much wealthier than present-day
society that they will be easily capable of mitigating any climate problems that arise. As Schelling [41]
(p. 9) puts it, “If per capita income growth in the next 40 years compares with the 40 years just past,
vulnerability to climate change should diminish, and the resources available for adaptation should be
greater.” Taking a longer time horizon, Nordhaus criticizes the Stern Review’s call for immediate, sharp
reductions in greenhouse gas emissions [7] as inconsistent with projections for continuing economic
growth in the integrated assessment model used in the Review: “Global per capita consumption today
is around $10,000. According to the Review’s assumptions, this will grow at 1.3 percent per year, to
around $130,000 in two centuries. Using these numbers, how persuasive is the ethical stance that we
have a duty to reduce current consumption by a substantial amount to improve the welfare of the rich
future generations?” [6] (p. 694). Recognizing that continued economic growth is inherently uncertain
would lead to taking the potential damage to future generations more seriously and strengthens the case
for investing in reducing greenhouse gas emissions now rather than later. This adds to considerations
such as uncertainty about the value to assign future generations [42,43] and about the climate impacts of
greenhouse gas emissions [44,45], which also move the policy optimum in the same direction [46].
5. The Influence of Future Economic Growth on Optimal Present Climate Policy
Here, I quantify the dependence of optimal present policy on assumptions about future economic
growth using a simple model of economic growth, greenhouse gas emissions and the impacts of
climate change on human welfare. The Dynamic Integrated model of Climate and the Economy
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(DICE) [4] parametrizes the impact of climate change as an economic cost, allowing this cost to be
compared to the costs of reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Here, I use DICE-2007 (Delta Version 8),
described by [6,47].
In DICE, economic production is a function of available labor and capital multiplied by their assumed
productivity. Production can be consumed or invested, where investment acts to increase future capital.
In line with the neoclassical model of economic growth [48], long-term increase in per capita income
follows closely the assumed rate of productivity increase due to technical progress. The damage caused
by human-caused warming is expressed as a fractional reduction in useful production that worsens with
increasing temperature change. Warming is, in turn, a function of the greenhouse gas concentration
history, which depends on the emission history. Greenhouse gas emissions are assumed proportional to
economic production (with a proportionality factor that gradually decreases with time to reflect expected
“decarbonization” of economic activity).
Greenhouse gas emissions can be reduced by taxing them or even eliminated entirely by setting a
high enough tax on emissions: under a carbon tax, emissions decrease to the point where the marginal
cost of abatement equals the carbon tax rate. Carbon taxes are an exogenous variable in DICE: that is,
the tax rate at each time step is set by the user. Given other user-specified assumptions, such as those
relating to economic growth rates, it is possible to search for an “optimum” carbon tax trajectory, which
maximizes the sum of utility over the simulation period, using an optimization tool which calls DICE
repeatedly with different carbon tax trajectories. If a carbon tax is imposed, the abatement cost, which
is assumed to be an increasing function of the amount of emissions reduction, is then deducted from the
world production available for consumption and investment, decreasing utility in the short run; on the
other hand, over the long run, the induced reduction in emissions tends to increase utility by limiting
climate change and, thus, the damage induced by human-caused warming.
As configured, DICE is run on 10-year time steps for 600 years (60 time steps), beginning in
the decade centered on 2005 (“present”). The utility of the economic situation at each time step
is an increasing function of consumption. The summed utility is discounted by a pure rate of time
preference (set by default at 1.5% per year). Under Nordhaus’ default assumptions, different versions of
DICE [4–6] consistently have optimum abatement trajectories that start with low tax rates on emissions
(about $28 (2005 dollars) per ton of carbon for the decade of the 2000s in DICE-2007) which gradually
increase over the 21st century to eventually stabilize emissions.
To explore the impact of assumptions about economic growth on optimum emission-control
trajectories in DICE, I optimized carbon taxes and investment rates over the 60 time steps to maximize
summed discounted utility, varying only one parameter from its default value: the assumed rate of
increase in factor (labor and capital) productivity. This rate is by default 0.92%/year for the first time
period (and taken to gradually decrease over subsequent time periods), corresponding to a production
growth rate of some 1.6%/year over the first century (2005–2100). The optimum carbon tax rate for the
first time period, shown in Figure 2a, illustrates how assumptions about future economic growth affect the
extent to which it is cost-effective to reduce greenhouse gas emissions now. The present optimum carbon
tax rises as assumed future economic growth decreases, but this increase is rather slow for the range of
economic growth values usually used in climate change studies: a decrease in assumed 21st century
economic growth to 0.4%/year (from the default 1.6%/year) is needed to double the optimum tax from
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its default $28 per ton of carbon, while the higher economic growth rates featured in the SRES scenarios
(1.9%–3.1%/year for 2005–2100) reduce the optimum tax level slightly to $18–25/tonC. The future
utility loss from warming and, hence, the utility gain from emissions control now (Figure 2b), increases
under slower economic growth, because a given fractional reduction in production due to warming is
more burdensome in a relatively poor as compared to a wealthy society. In fact, the utility gain from
emissions control is larger even though the assumed uncontrolled emission trajectory and, hence, the
amount of greenhouse warming, is considerably lower under slow economic growth than under default
economic growth. (Since the utility function in DICE is a transformation of global production trajectory
intended to measure social welfare, for a given formulation of this function, we can think of the change
in utility induced by climate policy as a qualitative indicator of the climate damage averted, although the
absolute numerical utilities are arbitrary.)
Figure 2. Consequences of the assumed future economic growth rate for the optimal
regulation of greenhouse gas emissions within the integrated assessment model DICE. In
each panel, the solid (lower) line is for a discount rate (pure time preference) of 1.5%/year,
and the dash-dot (upper) line is for a discount rate of 0.1%/year. The vertical dashed line
indicates the growth rate under the default model assumptions (about 1.6%/year). The
vertical axes are logarithmically scaled. (a) Optimal present-day (2000–2010) carbon tax
(2005 $ per ton C) as a function of the assumed economic growth rate; (b) gain in utility
(arbitrary units) under the optimal greenhouse gas control trajectory compared with no
emission control, as a function of the assumed economic growth rate. With slower economic
growth, climate change has a more marked effect on utility, and earlier and more stringent
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The impact of economic growth assumptions on optimal emission trajectories in DICE is sensitive
to several other parameters in the model, including the pure rate of time preference and the dependence
of utility on income. The assumed 1.5%/year pure rate of time preference effectively attenuates the
relevance of future generations’ suffering for present decisions [49]. If we now change the assumed
pure rate of time preference to 0.1%/year, matching that used in Stern [7] and granting much more
importance to the utility losses of future generations, the increase in the present optimum carbon tax rate
with decreasing assumed future economic growth is sharper. The tax rate approximately doubles from
its default (which at $65/tonC, is already more than double the $28/tonC optimum under a 1.5%/year
rate of time preference) if assumed economic growth drops to 1.0%/year and quadruples for growth of
0.5%/year (Figure 2a).
The impact of the future economic growth rate on the optimal carbon tax is also importantly affected
by the assumed dependence of utility on per-capita income. In DICE-2007, the marginal utility of an
additional dollar of income is assumed to scale as the inverse square of current income, corresponding to
an elasticity of two for the utility of consumption. (According to Nordhaus [50], the original DICE model
from 1992 employed a value of one for numerical reasons, to improve the convergence of optimization
runs.) This parameter is also known as the coefficient of relative risk aversion or of inequality aversion.
A higher elasticity would increase the impact of economic growth on the utility loss induced by global
warming and on the optimal carbon tax level (steepen the slopes of the curves in Figure 2), while a
lower elasticity would decrease the impact. Thus, at an elasticity of three (and a discount rate of 1.5%),
the optimal present-day carbon tax level triples from $17/tonC to $51/tonC as the assumed economic
growth rate decreases from the default 1.6%/year to 0.4%/year, while at an elasticity of one, the optimal
carbon tax level is about $60/tonC regardless of the assumed economic growth rate (Figure 3). While the
exact value of this elasticity is arbitrary and empirical evidence on people’s preferences shows substantial
variation [51], an elasticity of about two is generally regarded as reasonable [52] and is used in economic
studies of such things as investment behavior [53,54] and spending on medical care [55]. Further,
consistency with observed savings behavior may require higher elasticity values to be coupled with low
rates of time preference [6], which is a combination of parameters that would tend to make the optimal
carbon tax particularly sensitive to the economic growth trajectory.
While I have used the DICE model here because of its simplicity and straightforward description,
simplifications made in DICE may lead to understatements of the benefit of emissions control policies
under given assumed economic growth. DICE assumes that, for a given carbon tax level, emissions scale
linearly with economic production, and that decarbonization of the economy occurs at a prescribed rate.
In fact, if investment in research, development and infrastructure replacement is required to increase
energy efficiency [10], energy efficiency may, as argued above, improve more slowly in slow-growth
compared to high-growth scenarios, so that emissions per unit of production would be higher. As well,
emissions reduction policies, such as a carbon tax, stimulate investment that decreases the unit cost
of emission reductions over time, making a carbon tax more economically attractive than in a model
like DICE, where no such “learning curve” exists [56–58]. Further work with DICE and with more
complex models is therefore needed to understand the sensitivity of the numerical results reported here
to parameter uncertainty and to model structural assumptions.
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Figure 3. Optimal present-day (2000–2010) carbon tax (2005 $ per ton C) as a function
of assumed economic growth rate under different assumed values of µ, the elasticity for
the utility of consumption, and a discount rate (pure time preference) of 1.5%/year. The
vertical dashed line indicates the growth rate under the default model assumptions (about
1.6%/year). The vertical axis is logarithmically scaled. The results shown in Figure 2 use



































Long-term economic development is uncertain, and a variety of scenarios are plausible for changes
in the size of various components of the world economy. Climate policy analyses must incorporate the
full diversity of plausible future economic growth trajectories, including ones where economic growth
slows or stops, as well as ones where economic growth continues in the context of technological and
societal restructuring that allows massively increased production. Because the dependence of climate
damages and the optimal carbon tax rates on future economic growth rate is close to, or more than,
exponential (roughly straight, or concave up, lines in Figure 2a,b), even a moderate probability assigned
to the lowest growth rates examined can substantially nudge the current climate policy seen as optimal
toward immediate stringent controls on greenhouse gas emissions.
Under slow economic growth, growth in energy demand would be curtailed, which should slow
climate change, but a shift to highly polluting fuels and a lack of capital to control emissions might offset
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some of the resultant reduction in emissions. Slow economic growth means that future generations will
be less able to absorb the harms of climate change, which increases the urgency, and the likely payoff,
of cutting emissions now through switching to renewable sources of energy and increasing the efficiency
with which energy and materials are used to increase human welfare. Given that fossil fuel supplies are
limited, investment in renewable energy has the double benefit of both reducing climate-change damage
and putting the world economy on a more sustainable basis for continued growth in production.
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